UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-11-2014

Wagner v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41677

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Wagner v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41677" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5053.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5053

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO

RICHARD JOSEPH WAGNER,

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NO. 41677

)

)

ADA COUNTY NO. CV 2012-5009

)

ST ATE OF iDAHO,

)
)
)

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE DEBORAH A. BAIL
District Judge

SARA 8. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho

I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
1.5.B. #8701
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208} 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720~0010
(208) 334-4534

,..

..

,-

rile
DEC 11 20i4

ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ -1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 2
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 3
ARGUl\t1ENT ..........................................................................................................4
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Wagner's
Petition For Post Conviction Relief Even Though He Presented
Evidence Sufficient To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact .................... .4
A. Mr. Wagner's Claim That His Trial Attorney Was Ineffective For
Not Challenging The Admissibility Of His Prior Record At Trial
Was Not Waived By Post Conviction Counsel. ........................................... 4
B. Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Challenging The
Admissibility Of His Prior Record At Trial ................................................... 8
C. Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His
Trial Attorney Gave Erroneous Assertion Regarding The
Sentence He Would Receive If He Did Not Plead Guilty .......................... 10
D. Mr. Wagner Alleged Sufficient Evidence To Survive Summary
Dismissal In Regard To Showing Prejudice Flowing From His
Trial Attorney's Deficient Performance On Both His
Allegations Of Deficient Performance ....................................................... 13
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148 (2007) .................................................. 11, 13, 14
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004) ....................................................... 12
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) ............................................. 12
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) .................................................... 12
Saykahmchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995) .................................................. 12
Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791 (Ct. App. 2012) ................................................ :15
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991) .....................................................................9
State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253 (2012) ............................................................... 12
State v. Grist, 14 7 Idaho 49 (2009) .......................................................................9
State v. Johnson, 148 ldaho 664 (2010) ............................................................... 9
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013) ...........................................................................9
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742 (1991) .................................................................9
State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963 (Ct. App. 1985) ...................................................... 7
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................. 13
Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664 (2011) .................................... 14

Rules
I.R.E. 404(b) .................................................................................................. 1, 6, 8

Additional Authorities
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 344 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) ............................................. 8

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Wagner appeals, contending that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his petition for post conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine
issue of material fact.

Specifically, he claims that defense counsel in his underlying

criminal case was ineffective for not responding to the State's motion to have of two of
Mr. Wagner's prior convictions declared admissible under I.RE. 404(b) and for coercing
his guilty plea by promising he would receive a life sentence if he did not plead guilty.
He alleged that he would not have pied guilty but fOi trial counsel's deficient
performance in these regards.
The State responds, primarily contending that Mr. Wagner's assertions of fact in
his affidavits were not sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact. Its analysis in
that regard is directly contrary to precedent in that, at the summary disposition phase of
post conviction proceedings, the facts, including those alleged in Mr. Wagner's own
affidavits, are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner. The State's
arguments also focus too narrowly on specific facts, ignoring other relevant facts in the
record that disprove the State's arguments.

Therefore, the State's arguments are

meritless and should be rejected.
As a result, this Court should reverse the order summarily dismissing the petition,
vacate the judgment in this case, and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedin s
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Wagner's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition for post
conviction relief even though he presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue
of material fact.

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred B Summaril Dismissin Mr. Wa ner's Petition For Post
Conviction Relief Even Though He Presented Evidence Sufficient To Raise A Genuine
Issue Of Material Fact

A.

Mr. Wagner's Claim That His Trial Attorney Was Ineffective For Not Challenging
The Admissibility Of His Prior Record At Trial Was Not Waived By Post
Conviction Counsel
The State contends that this Court cannot consider Mr. Wagner's claim - that his

attorney was ineffective for not fighting against the State's request to present the facts
underlying two prior convictions at trial - because post conviction counsel purpotiedly
waived the claim below.

(Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) That assertion by the State fails to

appreciate the entire argument that post conviction counsel made below.

Post

conviction counsel was explaining that there were several different ways that the claim,
as articulated in Mr. Wagner's pro se petition, could be interpreted.

As such, post

conviction counsel was directing the district court to the proper interpretation of the
claim Mr. Wagner wanted to pursue and conceding the alternate interpretations did not
constitute bases for relief. Post conviction counsel did not concede the argument that
Mr. Wagner intended to pursue.

In fact, he reiterated the request for an evidentiary

hearing on that claim in his brief and at the summary disposition hearing. 1 (R., p.57;
Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.15-20.)
In his memorandum in support of Mr. Wagner's claims, post conviction counsel
noted that "Petitioner's pleading [on this issue] is confusing." (R., p.56.) In his pro se
petition, Mr. Wagner claimed, "Counsel did not fight to keep 13 [year] old evidence out

1

The fact that post conviction counsel continued to request an evidentiary hearing on
this claim affirmatively demonstrates that he was not conceding the issue.
4

of court. . . . Counsel failed to argue to keep prior record out of court records."
(R., pp.5-6.)

In the affidavit accompanying the pro se petition, he added, "My

attorney ... did not argue to keep a 13 year old felony conviction from being used
against me. Further he allowed the prosecuting attorney to rely solely upon my criminal
record for a conviction rather than any evidence in the present case."
He clarified in a subsequent affidavit, "2.

(R., p.9.)

My Trial Counsel told me my prior record

would cause me to lose at jury trial. 3. I only plead [sic] guilty because Trial Counsel
told me I would lose at jury trial. ... 6. I would have asked the case be tried to a jury,
but Trial Counsel advised me I would lose because of my prior record." (R., pp.73-74.)
Because the thrust of Mr. Wagner's claim was unclear, post conviction counsel sought
to clarify the claim.
To that end, post conviction counsel explained that the claim Mr. Wagner
intended to pursue was that he "was led to believe his history would be admitted at trial,
the jury would convict him because of his [criminal] history, and he would suffer a far
worse fate than what was contemplated by the plea agreement. The Petitioner pied this
in his petition as: Trial Counsel having failed to keep the information 'out' as he should
have." (R., p.56.) Post conviction counsel maintained, "Petitioner asks this court to
deny the State's request to dismiss and allow the matter to go to evidentiary hearing."
(R., pp.56-57.)
Post conviction counsel provided an additional explanation of his clarification of
the issue at the summary dismissal hearing:

5

With regard to the prior history -- the prior history from the state of
New York,[2] I explained to my client that it probably wouldn't come in
in [sic] trial unless it were 404(b) evidence and it were somehow attached
to be a common scheme or plan.
I certainly conceded in my memorandum that the Court absolutely
would consider that type of information at sentencing. It's absolutely
appropriate for the court to consider at sentencing. And I'm certain that
[the prosecutor] would have and did both highlight his criminal history as
an aggravating feature at sentencing in this particular case.
But I think the way I explained it in terms of interpreting the pro se
petition that's been filed before Your Honor was that [trial counsel] said
that you [Mr. Wagner] would be facing a much worse outcome and that
you can't take the case to trial because of your prior history. And I think
what my client heard was: I won't [take] the case to trial, and you need to
plead guilty and accept this offer.
At least that's the way he has explained it to me. I realize that, in
and of itself isn't grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel. But that's
certainly the way Mr. Wagner would want anyone reading his affidavit and
petition to appreciate the nature of the allegation that he's making.
I also brought up the issue of voluntariness, intelligence, and
knowing making a plea. I think 1\/lr. Wagner believes he was duped into
pleading guilty, and he would want this Court to deny the State's request
to dismiss and allow him to proceed to an evidentiary hearing.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.20.) As such, post conviction counsel framed the argument
IVlr. Wagner was pursuing as an allegation that the prior history would not have been
admissible at trial and trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that point. (R., p.56.)
Post conviction counsel also argued that there was a basis for trial counsel to have
made that argument: "I explained to my client that [the prior record] probably wouldn't
come in in [sic] trial unless it were 404(b) evidence and it were somehow attached to be
a common scheme or plan." (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.16-19.) On that claim, post conviction
counsel maintained that Mr. Wagner should receive an evidentiary hearing. (R., p.57;
Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.15-20.)

2

Only one of the prior convictions was from New York; the second was from Virginia.
( See, e.g., R., pp.65-66.)
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Looking at post conviction counsel's entire argument, it becomes clear that post
conviction counsel's concessions only relate to potential interpretations of the claim
that Mr. Wagner was not pursuing. For example, post conviction counsel explained that
Mr. Wagner was not arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for not keeping the prior
convictions out of the sentencing proceedings.

(R., p.56; Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.20-23.)

Therefore, he "conceded" the prior convictions were appropriately considered during the
sentencing phase of the proceedings.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.20-22.)

Similarly, post

conviction counsel explained that Mr. Wagner was not arguing that trial counsel forced
him to plead guilty by saying that he would not try the case, since post conviction
counsel believed that such a claim would not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. 3 (Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.2-1 ·1.)
On appeal, Mr. Wagner continues to pursue the issue post conviction counsel
raised:

his trial attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable because trial

counsel did not fight to keep Mr. Wagner's criminal record from being declared
admissible at trial, even though Idaho Supreme Court precedent on point reveals that

Post conviction counsel was mistaken in that assertion. The defendant has the right to
decide whether or not to take a case to trial. See, e.g., State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963,
965-66 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that trial counsel cannot waive the right to a trial, the
defendant must do that personally). Certainly, counsel may offer advice in that regard,
but ultimately, the decision belongs to the defendant. See id. Therefore, trial counsel's
refusal to try to the case despite the defendant's wishes would constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, as the State points out, post conviction counsel
conceded that particular argument - that counsel forced him to plead guilty by saying he
would not try the case. Therefore, were Mr. Wagner attempting to pursue that particular
claim on appeal, the State's argument would be well taken. But since Mr. Wagner is not
pursuing that particular claim, the State's argument - that this Court cannot consider the
merits of Mr. Wagner's claim because post conviction counsel conceded the point - is
mistaken.
3
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he would have been successful. Since that argument was never waived, it is properly
raised on appeal. As such, this Court should consider the rnerits of that claim.

B.

Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Counsel
Was Ineffective For Not Challenging The Admissibility Of His Prior Record At
Trial
On the merits of Mr. Wagner's claim - that trial counsel was ineffective by not

fighting to keep his prior record from being declared admissible at trial

~

the State

contends that the two prior convictions at issue would have been found relevant under
1.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of a common scheme or plan. (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) The
State's arguments are erroneous on several levels.
First, they are internally inconsistent. As the State points out, Mr. Wagner's prior
convictions dealt with acts that "appeared to be an almost impulsive manner." (Resp.
Br., p. ·12; see also Resp. Br., p.12 (referring to "[Mr.] Wagner's previous conviction for
impulsively molesting [a child]").) When a person acts impulsively, they are acting on
"[a] sudden urge or inclination that prompts an unplanned action."
DICTIONARY,

BLACK'S LAW

344 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) (emphasis added). Thus, impulsive actions are,

by definition, not part of some preconceived plan or scheme. See id. Therefore, the
State's contention that these impulsive prior acts would somehow be relevant under
I.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of a common scheme or plan is palpably absurd and should
be rejected as such.
Second, applying the rule set forth, and consistently reaffirmed, by the Idaho
Supreme Court in regard to prior bad acts potentially relevant as evidence of a common
scheme or plan, it is clear that Mr. Wagner's prior convictions were irrelevant to any
purpose but propensity. The State contends that, because there are similar features
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between those past actions and the act Mr. Wagner was alleged to have committed in
this case, the prior acts were relevant beyond mere propensity.

(Resp. Br., p.12.)

However, that analysis does not incorporate the entirety of the Idaho Supreme Court's
rule.

The prior acts must be "so related to each other that proof of one tends to

establish the other."

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 9 (2013) (emphasis from original);

Statev. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54-55 (2009); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 750-51

(1991 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )).

This

means that there must be '"evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare
fact that' the defendant has committed the same kind of misconduct in the past."
Joy, 155 Idaho at 9 (quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668 (2010)) (emphasis

added). The Supreme Court has explained, "In other words, at a minimum, there must
be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct
has occurred with children in the past." Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668. Thus, the Idaho
Supreme Court held in Johnson, for example, that the fact that the victims were similar
in age, the defendant had a similar relationship to the victims, and the touching was
similar in nature was not sufficient to establish that the evidence was relevant to some
non-propensity purpose. Id. at 669.
However, that is all the State argues in this case - that Mr. Wagner committed
the same kind of act by touching children of a similar age in a similar way with a similar

(i.e., non-existent) relationship to them and that makes the prior bad act evidence
relevant for a non-propensity purpose. 4

(Resp. Br., p.12.)

As that argument is

The State's argument is particularly inappropriate in this case, where the prior conduct
occurred across the country fourteen years ago. (See, e.g., R., pp.65-66; Supp.
R., pp.57-58.) The significant temporal and spacial separation between the prior
4
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expressly foreclosed by Idaho Supreme Court precedent, it does not demonstrate that
the district court's decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's claim was appropriate.
Therefore, considering the argument Mr. Wagner has pursued on appeal, based
on the facts in the record considered in the light most favorable to him, there is, at least,
a genuine issue of fact as to trial counsel's ineffectiveness for not pursuing a legitimate
argument against the admission of his prior convictions.

If resolved in his favor,

Mr. Wagner would be entitled to relief on that claim. As such, the district court erred
when it summarily dismissed his petition.
Furthermore, the State does not respond to the fact that the district court did not
resolve the issue presented by Mr. Wagner, but instead, focused on the admissibility of
the prior record evidence during the sentencing phase of the case.
Br., pp.8-9; see generally Resp. Br.)

(See App.

The fact that the district court's ruling was

inapposite to the argument Mr. Wagner was making demonstrates that, whatever else
this Court might determine on the merits of this issue, the district court's decision to
summarily dismiss the petition, which was based on an irrelevant analysis, was in error
and should be reversed.

C.

Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Attorney
Gave Erroneous Assertion Regarding The Sentence He Would Receive If He Did
Not Plead Guilty
Mr. Wagner also claims his trial attorney was ineffective because he coerced

Mr. Wagner to plead guilty by telling him he "would be" sentenced to a life term if he
went to trial.

(App. Br., pp.9-10.) The State contends that Mr. Wagner made only a

conduct and the alleged conduct in this case demonstrates that, despite the generic
similarities between the acts, the prior acts are not so related to the alleged conduct that
they are relevant to anything other than mere propensity.
10

bare conclusion, unsupported by facts. (Resp. Br., pp.12-14.) The State's argument is
rneritless, as it acknowledges Mr. Wagner made the following assertion of fact in his

own affidavit: '"Trial counsel told me I would be sentenced to life in prison if I lost at
trial."' (Resp. Br., p.13 (quoting R, p.73).) As that statement constitutes an assertion of
fact within Mr. Wagner's personal knowledge, it constitutes evidence which the district
court was required to consider in its summary dismissal calculus.

Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2007).

See, e.g.,

In Baldwin, the Idaho Supreme Court

explained, "Baldwin presents his own affidavit describing his version of the interaction
[in question]. Baldwin's affidavit sets forth facts that would be admissible at trial. Thus,
because Baldwin's Petition and Affidavit

present facts that would entitle Baldw1n to

relief, if he were able to prove them at a hearing, the district court erred when it
surnmariiy dismissed the petition." Id. (emphasis added). Like the petitioner in Baldwin,
Mr. Wagner alleged facts in his own affidavit that demonstrated his attorney performed
deficiently.

Thus, Mr. Wagner presented sufficient evidence to survive summary

judgment.
Nevertheless, the State contends that, because a life sentence was one potential
sentence that might have been imposed, "trial counsel was right to be concerned about

the possibility of a life sentence," and therefore, his advice was not objectively
unreasonable.

(Resp. Br., pp.13-14 (emphasis added).)

However, the State's

argument in that regard does not demonstrate that summary dismissal of this case was
appropriate. All the State's argument does is highlight the genuine issue of material fact
that existed on this issue - what did trial counsel tell Mr. Wagner? The two possibilities
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are 1) that he told tvlr. Wanger that a life sentence would be imposed, and 2) that he told
Mr. Wagner that a life sentence might be imposed.
At the summary dismissal stage, the district court is required to construe the facts
in the light most favorable to the defendant. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793
(2004) (quoting Saykahmchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995)). Applying that rule
in this case means that, at the summary dismissal stage, the district court was required
to consider the claim as though Mr. Wagner was correct, and trial counsel told him that
he would be sentenced to a life term. That phrasing - "would be" - indicates that the
life term was more than a mere possibility, but rather, was definitely the sentence that
would have been imposed if he did not plead guilty. Thus, by telling Mr. Wagner he
"would be" sentenced to a life term if he did not plead guilty, trial counsel was promising
a particular sentence would result from Mr. Wagner's choice on the plea agreement.
When a promise that a particular sentence will result and that promise induces
the defendant to plead guilty, the defendant is entitled to relief. See Puckett v. United
States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493
(1962); State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253,256 (2012) (adopting the rationale from Puckett
and applying it to plea agreements and promises made therein). Thus, as in Baldwin,
Mr. Wagner's affidavit created, at least, a genuine issue of material fact that his attorney
performed in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Furthermore, if that claim were

resolved in his favor, Mr. Wagner would be entitled to relief.
dismissal was inappropriate.

12

Therefore, summary

D.

Mr. Wa ner Alie ed Sufficient Evidence To Survive Summa
Dismissal In
Regard To Showing Prejudice Flowing From His Trial Attorney's Deficient
Performance On Both His Alie ations Of Deficient Performance
Despite acknowledging that Mr. Wagner asserted, in his own affidavit, that

'"I would have asked the case be tried to a jury, but Trial Counsel advised me I would
lose because of my prior record,"' the State maintains that Mr. Wagner did not present
sufficient evidence speaking to the prejudice prong of the StricklancJ analysis. 5 (Resp.
Br., p.14 (quoting R., p.74).) As before, this argument is meritless because statements
of fact in the petitioner's own affidavit alone may constitute sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 155. The State cannot justify the decision to
summarily dismiss the petition simply because it disagrees with the fact alleged by
Mr. Wagner in his own affidavit, yet that is exactly what it tries to do in this case.
(See Resp. Br., p. ·14.) If Mr. Wagner's sworn assertion of fact is true, he was prejudiced

by his trial attorney's deficient performance, and thus, summary dismissal of his claim
was inappropriate.
Furthermore, the State's assertion - that Mr. Wagner's sworn statement that he
would not have pied guilty at that time is insufficient evidence to satisfy the prejudice
prong - ignores the thrust of Strickland's prejudice analysis.

StricklancJ calls for an

examination of the subjective thought process of the petitioner himself during the plea
negotiations.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Obviously, the petitioner is the only

person competent to offer evidence as to what thoughts were going through his mind.
Therefore, the State's contention that Mr. Wagner's sworn statement to that effect is not

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984 ), established the two-prong test for
analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
5
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sufficient to establish, at least, a genuine issue of material fact on the prejudice prong of
the Strickland analysis is meritless.
In fact, by arguing that point, the State is arguing for a credibility determination at
the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.

It wants the courts to judge the

credibility of the allegation in Mr. Wagner's affidavit, find it to be not credible based on
the purported credibility of other evidence in the record, and thus, summarily dismiss his
claims. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) That argument runs contrary to a basic tenet of civil
law6 : that "judging credibility is not appropriate during summary judgment proceedings
where no evidentiary hearing has been held."

Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 150

Idaho 664, 674 (20·11 ). As such, the State's argument is wholly improper and should be
rejected.
The

State

also

points to the

plea

colloquy as

Mr. Wagner's assertion that he would have demanded a trial.

evidence contradicting
(Resp. Br., pp.14-15.)

However, that argument ignores one of the other factual assertions Mr. Wagner made in
his own affidavit: "Trial Counsel did not advise me to lie at my entry of plea, but he told

me the court would not accept my plea if the questions were not answered
properly." (R., p.74 (emphasis added).) Therefore, he contended, as a matter of fact,
that the answers in the plea colloquy were not reliable. That means, despite how much
the State would like to rely on the answers from the plea colloquy as undisputed facts,
they are not; Mr. Wagner disputed each and every answer he gave at that time in his
sworn affidavit.

Because those facts were disputed, the district court was not free to

rely on them in support of its decision to summarily dismiss the petition.

6

See, e.g.,

Since post conviction claims are civil in nature, the rules of civil law apply to this case.
See, e.g., Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153.
14

Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 79·1, 796 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When considering summary
dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor .... ")
Besides, even if the State is correct, and the district court could properly weigh those
answers against Mr. Wagner's allegation during the summary judgment phase, all that
contradictory evidence does is create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of
prejudice. As such, the district court's decision to summarily dismiss the petition is still
erroneous.
Therefore, the State's arguments fail to demonstrate, at any level, that the district
court's decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's petition was appropriate. As such,
this Court should reverse that order, vacate the final judgment and remand this case for
the evidentiary hearing to which Mr. Wagner is entitled.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wagner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order summarily
dismissing his petition, vacate the final judgment, and remand this case for an
evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 11

th

day of December, 2014.
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